A Tale of Two Campaigns: Domain Dominance and Divergent Doctrines in the War for Ukraine

The Resistance Hub

In recent weeks, Ukraine executed long-range drone strikes that disabled or destroyed over 40 Russian strategic aircraft across bases deep inside Russian territory. These strikes were not symbolic—they were targeted disruptions of Russia’s strike capacity. Meanwhile, Russia continues to fire missiles and drones at Ukrainian cities, hitting apartment buildings, energy infrastructure, and hospitals.

These two approaches reveal incompatible theories of victory. Russia is waging a war on morale, seeking to erode the will of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine is waging a war on capability, aiming to dismantle Russia’s tools of war through precision and disruption.

But this contrast is only part of the picture. Ukraine is not fighting a single campaign—it is waging four distinct, overlapping efforts:

1. A strategic targeting campaign inside Russian territory
2. A static, attritional land war rooted in positional defense
3. A maritime denial campaign in the Black Sea
4. A global information campaign to secure and sustain international support

Each campaign has achieved limited success. Yet none have translated into strategic breakthroughs, because Ukraine cannot integrate and capitalize on these victories across domains. It is winning pieces of the war, but cannot yet assemble them into a decisive operational whole.

Strategic Targeting: A War of Precision

Modern doctrine defines a center of gravity as the source of an actor’s strength and cohesion. For Russia, that center is Ukrainian morale. For Ukraine, it is Russia’s ability to generate and sustain force.

Russia continues to strike Ukrainian civilians, hoping to exhaust public resolve. But years of war have hardened Ukrainian civil society. Each attack deepens national cohesion and increases international support.

Ukraine, meanwhile, focuses its limited long-range capability on Russia’s airbases, fuel depots, radar systems, and military infrastructure. These strikes inflict material losses and force defensive realignments. Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers, radar networks, and command facilities have all been degraded.

These are not psychological operations. They are targeted efforts to dismantle Russian military capacity. But they remain isolated. Ukraine lacks the deep-strike mass or air superiority to exploit the temporary disarray it creates.

The Air–Land Lockdown

Alongside strategic strikes, Ukraine continues to fight a static, positional war across Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. It is a war of trenches, minefields, and artillery—reminiscent of World War I in scale and tempo.

Russia attacks with waves of infantry and armor, backed by artillery. Ukraine defends with layered fortifications, drone-guided fires, and tactical withdrawals. The result is a grinding stalemate.

But this stagnation is shaped not just by terrain, but by the mutually denied airspace above it.

Neither side has achieved air dominance. Russia fears Ukrainian SAMs and MANPADS. Ukraine lacks a modern air force. Both operate under the constant threat of drone strikes and air defense systems. Without close air support or freedom to maneuver in the air, ground breakthroughs are rare and unexploitable.

Air denial has frozen the front. Without control above, mobility below becomes suicidal. The land war has become attritional by necessity, not design.

The Black Sea Campaign: Denying Kalibr Fires

Among Ukraine’s most successful strategic efforts has been its maritime denial campaign in the Black Sea. This was not a symbolic campaign. It was designed to achieve a specific purpose: disrupt Russia’s ability to launch Kalibr cruise missiles from naval platforms targeting Ukrainian cities.

Using Neptune missiles, maritime drones, and real-time ISR support, Ukraine degraded or destroyed key Russian vessels—most famously the Moskva. It repeatedly struck Sevastopol and other logistical nodes, forcing the Russian Black Sea Fleet to reposition east of Crimea.

This was not just a naval operation—it was a counter–center of gravity campaign. It sought to deny Russia a strike vector used to terrorize civilians and undermine morale. By removing the sea as a launch platform, Ukraine blunted one of Russia’s core psychological tools.

It also saved lives. The volume and frequency of Kalibr strikes fell. Cities were safer. Pressure on civilian morale was reduced.

Yet this success was domain-limited. Ukraine denied access, but could not follow up with maritime dominance. It lacked the naval capacity for broader sea control or amphibious operations.

Parallel Campaigns with a Deeper Purpose

Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes on Russian airbases are the air domain equivalent of the Black Sea campaign. Both aim to deny Russia the ability to launch standoff attacks on Ukrainian civilians, not to gain air or sea superiority.

This is not coincidental—it is strategic. Ukraine has adopted a coherent philosophy: if it cannot dominate a domain, it will disrupt its use as a platform for striking civilians.

Just as maritime drones drove Russian ships from the western Black Sea, Ukraine now seeks to put strategic aviation bases at risk, forcing Russia to disperse assets, degrade tempo, and reduce strike volume. Engels, Mozdok, and other airbases are no longer safe.

But these denial campaigns also carry risk. As Ukraine closes down Russia’s standoff options, the Kremlin may respond with disproportionate or escalatory reprisals. Denying a powerful adversary’s preferred tools can provoke dangerous reactions, especially when that denial is effective.

Ukraine is walking a fine line: protecting its people while avoiding a horizontal or vertical escalation of the conflict.

The Information Campaign: Winning Minds, Not Ground

Ukraine’s dominance in the information space has been a critical enabler of external support. Through compelling wartime communication, decentralized civilian reporting, and international media savvy, Ukraine has shaped global perception of the conflict.

Western aid, sanctions against Russia, and ongoing diplomatic pressure all stem in part from this narrative success.

But like the other campaigns, this success is constrained. Narrative dominance does not guarantee ammunition. Sympathy does not ensure timely resupply. The information campaign shapes conditions—but does not directly shift battlefield dynamics unless integrated with logistical and operational power.

The Seven Domains: Operational Contest Across the Spectrum

Ukraine and Russia contest seven core domains of modern war. Each reflects strengths, vulnerabilities, and the limits of asymmetric power.

Campaigns Without Convergence

Ukraine’s four campaigns—strategic strikes, land defense, sea denial, and information warfare—each show effectiveness. But they remain unintegrated.

• The strike campaign damages airbases—but cannot capitalize without deep airpower.
• The land campaign holds ground—but cannot maneuver without air support.
• The sea campaign isolates Russia’s fleet—but cannot transition to maritime control.
• The information campaign secures legitimacy—but cannot substitute for mass or tempo.

This is the paradox of asymmetric warfare: disruption without exploitation. Ukraine can degrade Russia’s ability to strike, but not always translate that into sustained advantage.

Victory in multi-domain conflict requires more than disruption. It requires integration—the linking of denial, defense, narrative, and maneuver into a unified operational tempo.

Conclusion

Ukraine has achieved something remarkable. It has denied access without seizing ground. It has imposed caution without air superiority. It has reshaped the maritime and aerial battlespace without a navy or strategic air force.

It has done so through adaptation, creativity, and purpose.

But these siloed successes—born of strategic necessity and moral clarity—still demand one thing: convergence. Until Ukraine can integrate its effects and capitalize on disruption, it will continue to fight brilliantly—but may remain unable to deliver a decisive outcome.

It is fighting smart. It is fighting hard. But to win, it must fight together.

Source List

• BBC News – “Ukraine strikes airbases deep inside Russia”
• Defense Express – “Damage assessment of Russian Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers”
• Reuters – “Russia continues missile strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets”
• RAND Corporation – “Multi-Domain Operations and the Future of Warfare”
• Institute for the Study of War – Daily Campaign Assessments
• Verified battlefield OSINT (May 2024–May 2025)
• Ukrainian MOD statements and briefings