Sabotage in the Shadows: Pipeline Warfare and Resistance in West Africa

The Resistance Hub

On the muddy creeks of the Niger Delta and far out into the waters of the Gulf of Guinea, an invisible war continues to rage. Pipelines explode in the night. Energy multinationals scramble to reroute exports. Militants vanish into the mangroves, only to strike again days later. For more than two decades, pipeline sabotage in West Africa has remained a persistent form of irregular warfare—an asymmetric tool for resistance movements, criminal syndicates, and political actors alike. Now, in 2025, a fresh wave of sabotage is threatening energy flows, state stability, and regional security.

This is not merely criminal vandalism—it’s a form of infrastructure denial warfare. It holds lessons for insurgents and governments alike, and its strategic relevance is growing as oil markets tighten and state authority frays across the region.

The New Wave of Pipeline Attacks (2023–2025)

Sabotage operations have surged again across Nigeria’s southern oil-producing states. In March 2025, a major breach on the Bonny Export Pipeline caused the loss of over 80,000 barrels per day. While no group claimed responsibility, military sources suggested an organized faction operating near Rivers State. This followed a January 2025 explosion on the Trans-Niger Pipeline—a familiar flashpoint historically tied to insurgent activity.

Unlike the highly visible insurgencies of the early 2000s, today’s saboteurs operate in tighter, decentralized cells. Some work as contract agents for local elites, while others represent a new generation of eco-nationalists angry over environmental destruction, economic exclusion, and ongoing state repression.

Notable Attacks Since 2023:

• August 2023: Attack on the Escravos-Lagos Pipeline System, disrupting gas supply to several power plants.
• February 2024: Militants hit Shell’s Forcados terminal feeder line. Exports dropped by 50,000 barrels per day for over a week.
• Late 2024: Coordinated breaches across the Nembe Creek Trunk Line, with signs of shaped charges used—indicating technical adaptation.

While oil theft remains a parallel issue, the strategic use of sabotage to deny state revenue and corporate profit has become a central tactic.

Nigeria’s Energy War Zone – A Historical Continuum

To understand today’s sabotage campaign, one must look to its origins.

In the early 2000s, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged as the dominant irregular actor in southern Nigeria. Their operations were not merely criminal—they were insurgent in structure, message, and impact. MEND used pipeline attacks, kidnappings, and ambushes to disrupt Nigeria’s oil economy and extract concessions from the government.

Following MEND’s temporary demobilization during the 2009 amnesty program, a vacuum opened—one filled by criminal syndicates and new militant actors like the Niger Delta Avengers, who re-emerged in 2016 with highly destructive attacks on offshore infrastructure.

Despite state repression, the grievances remain:

• Environmental devastation from decades of oil spills.
• Lack of infrastructure, healthcare, or jobs in host communities.
• Corruption and elite capture of oil wealth.

Sabotage, in this context, is not just tactical—it is symbolic resistance and an enduring form of localized warfare against a perceived extractive system.

Expanding the Battlefield – Gulf of Guinea Risks

The threat is no longer confined to Nigeria.

In Equatorial Guinea, reports of suspicious “technical failures” on undersea pipelines have sparked speculation about cross-border sabotage, possibly linked to regional smuggling networks. Cameroon’s Kribi terminal—a key gas export point—has increased patrols amid intelligence reports of planned disruptions. In Angola, the security of the deepwater Dalia and CLOV production hubs remains a quiet concern among foreign operators.

These attacks (or threats thereof) share similar features:

• Access via creeks, swamps, or shallow waters.
• Use of locally modified explosives or cutting tools.
• High knowledge of pipeline routes and weak points.
• Lack of a unified political ideology—blurring the line between insurgency, criminal enterprise, and state sabotage.

The maritime domain adds complexity. Offshore sabotage is harder to detect, often attributed to “technical issues,” and requires different defensive measures. But it’s increasingly clear that the Gulf of Guinea’s energy infrastructure is a contested battlespace.

Corporate and State Responses

The Nigerian state and its corporate partners have responded by combining militarization, privatization, and technological hardening.

Key Measures:

• Private Military Companies (PMCs): Firms like Ocean Marine Solutions have been contracted to guard offshore platforms and escort tankers.
• Drone and Satellite Surveillance: Nigeria’s NNPC and international oil firms are investing in aerial monitoring systems.
• Pipeline Surveillance Contracts: Surveillance and pipeline repair contracts have become a source of patronage—and sometimes conflict—among former militants.
• Hardening Infrastructure: Some sections are now buried deeper or armored with steel sheathing to resist sabotage.

Yet repression has its limits. Human rights groups have documented extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, and community crackdowns in areas near recent sabotage sites. This fuels the very grievances the sabotage feeds on.

Moreover, defense remains reactive. A strategic, preventive counter-sabotage doctrine is still lacking.

Irregular Warfare Lessons and Future Trajectories

Pipeline sabotage in West Africa is particularly relevant to irregular warfare theory because of its strategic asymmetry. Saboteurs with basic tools can inflict disproportionate economic and political damage.

Key insights:

• Infrastructure denial works: Attacks costing hundreds of dollars can halt multi-million dollar flows.
• Popular support matters: Local communities often remain silent or complicit, viewing militants as legitimate.
• Adaptation is key: Saboteurs are learning from drone warfare, maritime irregular operations, and cyber-sabotage.

There are signs this model may diffuse elsewhere. In Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, Islamist insurgents have already targeted energy projects. In the Sahel, future threats to pipeline corridors (e.g., the Niger-Benin pipeline) loom large.

Globally, this model is scalable—from Norway’s offshore rigs to America’s domestic pipelines. It’s part of the broader irregular warfare toolkit for the 21st century, blending economic disruption with kinetic impact.

Conclusion

Pipeline sabotage in West Africa is not a local anomaly—it’s a symptom of deeper structural wars over power, identity, and extraction. It fuses insurgency with economics, and its lessons are now relevant far beyond Nigeria’s swamps.

Governments and corporations can respond with repression and technology, but unless the core grievances are addressed, the sabotage will continue and perhaps expand. In the age of asymmetric conflict, a few determined actors with a wrench and some explosives can still shake global markets.

Sources & Further Reading

1. International Crisis Group – Stopping Nigeria’s Spiraling Violence (2024)
2. Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Reports – 2023–2024
3. Reuters – Nigeria’s Bonny Pipeline Attacked Again, Output Hit (March 2025)
4. BBC Africa – Niger Delta Avengers: The New Insurgency? (2024)
5. Human Rights Watch – Nigeria: Crackdown After Pipeline Sabotage (2023)
6. World Bank – Economic Impact of Oil Theft and Sabotage in Sub-Saharan Africa (2023)
7. Shell Nigeria – Pipeline Incident Reports (2023–2025)
8. UNODC – Organized Crime and the Gulf of Guinea (2024)
9. DefenseWeb – Gulf of Guinea Threat Landscape Expands to Energy Infrastructure (2025)
10. Academic Paper: Ikelegbe, Augustine. “State, Oil, and Militant Politics in the Niger Delta.” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2006).